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ABSTRACT 
 Innovation activities in high technology industries provide considerable challenges for 
technology and innovation management. In particular, since these industries have a long history 
of radical innovations taking place through distinct industry cycles of higher and lower demand, 
firms frequently consider the option to use acquisitions as a means for technology sourcing. The 
paper investigates this behaviour for three high technology industries, namely semiconductor 
manufacturing, biotechnology and electronic design automation which is a specific sub-segment 
of the semiconductor industry. It analyses the association of firm characteristics with different 
aspects of acquisition behaviour with a particular focus being put on innovation-related firm 
characteristics. The paper confirms a substitutive relationship between acquisitions and own 
research activities as well as between own and acquired firm patenting, but also finds that firm 
size, financial conditions and geographical origin of the firm matter for acquisition behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Innovation activities in high technology industries are diverse. In particular firms 
frequently face make-or-buy decisions, especially as concerns radical innovation. This, together 
with the cumulative and rapid nature of innovation means that acquisitions are a potentially very 
important route of technology sourcing and hence an interesting and relevant research topic that 
is also acknowledged in the literature (Bruno and Cooper, 1982; Chakrabarti and Burton, 1983; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005; Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005; Capron and Shen, 2007). The purpose 
of this paper is thus to more narrowly analyse the R&D-related determinants for the frequency 
and technological relevance of acquisitions and whether they are substitutive or complementary.  
Whilst earlier research has done so for a broader set of industries (e.g. Desyllas and 
Hughes (2008) for eight industries), this paper focus on a more narrow set of three high 
technology industries. Since the issue with analysing a broader set of industries is that the 
acquiring firms can be of two types: strongly technology oriented or weakly technology oriented. 
In the former case it has been proposed that acquisitions are complementary to the acquiring 
firms’ knowledge base and in the latter case that they substitute own R&D of the acquiring firm 
(Pieper, 1996). Empirically therefore, the former case would correspond to a positive, and the 
latter case to a negative association. In samples including a broader set of industries, both types 
of acquiring firms are present which may make it impossible to draw conclusions from the results 
about each type of firm separately since the empirical association is a mix of the (theoretically 
differing) associations for both types of firms. Therefore focussing on just a very narrowly 
defined set of three high technology industries in which firms are all of the strongly technology 
oriented type allows to draw more confidently conclusions for this latter type of firms alone. 
In a paper related this one, Desyllas and Hughes (2008) explore the relationship of R&D 
and patenting with acquisitions and find a largely substitutive link. I extend their study by using 
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the occurrence and extent of patenting by targets prior to acquisition as a more narrow measure of 
technology-related acquisitions. The number of (total and technological1) acquisitions and the 
technological value of acquisitions as measured based on prior patenting of the acquired start-ups 
jointly provide a very complete assessement of potential substitutive or complementary links 
between R&D determinants of acquirers and acquisitions.  
Also, by using a patent-based, narrower measure of the technology-relatedness of acquisitions my 
paper extends extant literature which so far has only used broad proxies such as a firm being 
privately held as means to delineate technology-related and unrelated acquisitions.2 The paper 
further contributes to the literature by addressing the question of a substitutive versus 
complementary relationship with a very specific measure of the technology-relatedness of 
acquisitions. It also contributes by providing a more detailed analysis of the link of target firm 
and acquirer patenting. After reviewing the literature in the next section, the paper derives 
hypotheses which are subsequently tested in the empirical analysis. After reporting the results, of 
this the paper draws conclusions and highlights managerial as well as academic implications. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Technology sourcing through acquisitions is a phenomenon well identified in the 
literature on high technology industries. For example in the semiconductor industry, levels of 
research and development (R&D) input are strongly affected by the highly cyclical nature of the 
                                                     
1 Technological or technologically-related acquisitions are defined in this paper as those, for which the target firm 
has been granted at least one patent in the five years prior to acquisition, see also Clooydt et al. (2006). Using patents 
to gauge technological capabilities is appropriate in a sample of high technology firms, since for the latter patenting 
is common also for small firms, for example to create collateral for venture capital investments. 
2 For example, Desyllas and Hughes (2008) only distinguish whether a firm makes no acquisitions in a year, acquires 
at least one public target, or acquires non-public targets only. Hence, it could be the case that a firm acquires ten non-
public targets and only one public target but would still be in their first category. This makes the interpretation of 
their results difficult, particularly since they do not in parallel provide the distribution of public versus non-public 
targets in their dummy variable for acquiring at least one public target. My approach using target patenting avoids 
such problems. 
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industry (Levy, 1994), whose most severe downturn was in 2000 to 2001. R&D expenditure has 
significantly dropped in this period and has not recovered so far. In parallel to this, 
semiconductor firms’ propensity to patent has considerably increased in US in 1980s, especially 
after formation of a centralized appellate court in 1982 as a means to strengthening patent rights 
(Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). As well, there is evidence of increasing innovation-related acquisition 
activity in the industry (Bloningen and Taylor, 2000; Sanchanta, 2007) Thus one effect of the 
downturn-induced drop in R&D funding and the parallel tightening of intellectual property rights 
seems to be a shift to a more open innovation model in the semiconductor industry, in which 
acquisitions play an important role (Pisano, 1990; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Puranam et al., 
2003; 2006; Graebner, 2004).  
Another example for the important role of innovation-related acquisitions is the electronic 
design automation (EDA) industry which focuses on chip design and covers a number of 
complex processes from abstract design through to chip testing. It has a highly concentrated 
market structure with three large firms and a significant number of small firms being active in the 
industry, the latter of which are frequently acquired by the industry’s large firms. Increasingly, 
the products of the electronic design automation industry also integrate into chip manufacturing 
processes in order to enable direct feedback from the production to the design stage in turn 
making innovation processes even more challenging and hence acquisitions as a means for 
technology sourcing potentially even more viable.  
Finally, the biotech industry is also characterised by strengthening patent rights 
(especially in the US) and rapid technological change with cumulative technologies. Again, 
acquisitions are a frequent phenomenon in this industry as are intensive collaboration and 
cooperation activities (Jack, 2007; Hoffmann, 2007; Jack, 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; 
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Pangarkar, 2003). Puranam et al. (2006) argue that the information technology and biotech 
industries are very similar with regard to acquisition behaviour aimed at technology sourcing. 
Next to acquisitions for technology sourcing, research on innovation networks (e.g. 
Teichert, 1994; Tidd et al., 2005) suggests that these are often considered as an alternative when 
innovation is so radical that no subgroup of firms can achieve it, but only a complete network. It 
may be in this case that a number of (larger or smaller) firms at the same level of the value chain 
cooperate closely. This concerns for example cooperation in the context of Sematech in the US 
since innovation in semiconductor manufacturing often requires large-scale industry cooperation 
as well as other forms of cooperation such as the innovation networks characterising cooperation 
of small textile firms in Italy’s industrial districts. This line of thinking is also relevant for the 
EDA and biotech industries. For example, Sangiovanni-Vincentelli (2003) argues that intensive 
research collaboration and innovation networks may be needed to bring about radical innovation 
in the EDA industry and Pangarkar and Klein (2001) and Zhang et al. (2007) point to the 
relevance of cooperation in the biotech industry.  
In addition to the literatures on external technology sourcing and innovation networks in 
high technology industries, another stream of scholarly work which is of relevance here is the 
economic theory of mergers and acquisitions in general and particularly the empirical studies 
related to it, for example in terms of make or buy decisions regarding technology sourcing (e.g. 
Rüdiger, 1998).  
This literature points to the fact that takeovers may be especially suitable if small start-ups come 
to a point where they do not realize their potential due to lack of complementary assets such as 
distribution channels or because of too slow growth.  
Overall, the literature review thus reveals evidence for the suitability of both approaches 
innovation networks as well as acquisitions to realise (in particular radical) innovation in high 
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technology industries. Given the significant body of work on innovation cooperation and 
networks (e.g. Ahuja, 2000; Mowery et al., 1998), the focus of the remainder of this paper is on 
acquisitions and in particular on what characteristics of acquiring firms (and here in particular 
those related to R&D) determine the acquisition of innovative or entrepreneurial start-ups as 
concerns the number of (total and technology-related) acquisitions and the technological value of 
acquisitions as measured based on prior patenting of the targets.3  
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Hitt et al. (1991) argue in the context of technological sourcing that acquisitions cause 
lower (industry-adjusted) R&D and (citation-weighted) patenting intensities and state that this is 
a partial explanation for the bad post-merger performance frequently encountered. Their 
argument, whilst proposing the same association of own R&D and acquisitions as Desyllas and 
Hughes (2008) reverses the causality. According to Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) issues of 
reverse causality are frequently the case in empirical management research and causality can only 
be inferred on the basis of theoretical arguments. The view that low R&D and patenting 
intensities causes acquisition activity is theoretically supported by the literatures on obstacles to 
innovation (e.g. Witte, 1973; Christensen and Bower, 1996) and on the division of labour for 
innovation (Williamson, 1975; Grandstrand and Sjolander, 1990) which posit that there are 
objective impediments that deter or render less efficient innovation especially in larger firms. 
Two main reasons for this seem to apply. Firstly, some innovations can be organisationally 
radical (e.g. Henderson and Clark, 1990) e.g. because firms require intensive learning and 
                                                     
3 Another reason for focussing in this paper on acquisitions is that initial exploratory interviews with experts in all 
three industries analysed (biotech, semiconductors and EDA) have revealed, that innovation cooperation and 
innovation networks in these industries is largely confined to pre-competitive research, which significantly limits the 
scope of an analysis of innovation cooperation (with the partial exception of biotech, where innovation cooperation 
activity is also observable between dyads of individual firms), as compared to acquisitions. 
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intellectual deliberation within the firm (Levinthal and March, 1993) or because radically 
different organisational structures for R&D are required (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Leonard-
Barton, 1992). Secondly, absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) can be lacking 
because different or new skills are required from technologists or researchers of a larger firm. 
Based on these causal mechanisms developed in the literature it can be concluded that the 
association between R&D activities acquisition should be negative, and especially so for 
technologically-related acquisitions leading to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: The R&D intensity of acquiring firms is negatively associated with the number of 
acquisitions. 
H1b: The association is stronger for technological acquisitions than it is for the acquisitions of a 
firm in general. 
H1c: The R&D intensity of acquiring firms is negatively associated with the number of patents 
granted to a target prior to acquisition.  
Economic theory has proposed a number of reasons for acquisitions (see e.g. Trautwein, 
1990; Morris and Hay, 1991; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  For example under the assumption 
that the stock market is efficient, motives for takeovers could be increased market power, reduced 
advertising and other promotional expenditure or efficiency gains which can not be realised 
without the acquisition. Other explanations that have been proposed for acquisitions are 
managerial takeovers, allocational takeovers, acquisitional takeovers or conglomerate mergers 
aimed at risk reduction (Morris and Hay, 1991).  Given the variety of motives for an acquisition, 
it may be that in acquisitions aimed at technology sourcing, firms aim to mitigate more specific 
weaknesses, such as low R&D output, as proxied by the patents generated in relation to the size 
of the firm (i.e. patenting intensity). Therefore, it is appropriate to compare different measures of 
acquirer R&D activity. In the case of patenting intensity, it could be that it is more strongly 
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associated than R&D intensity with the patent-related characteristics of targets. Hence comparing 
the association of R&D and patenting intensities with acquisition related variables and variables 
relating to the R&D characteristics of targets enable a direct test of how specific aquirers attempt 
to mitigate own weaknesses through external technology sourcing. Of course, to the extend that 
acquirers are rather unspecific in mitigating weaknesses, the links proposed in H1a and H1b with 
regard to acquisitions in general and more narrowly defined technological acquisitions should 
still hold in the case of patenting intensity. Therefore the following hypotheses are formulated 
with regard to patenting intensity: 
H2a: The patenting intensity of acquiring firms is negatively associated with the number of 
acquisitions. 
H2b: The association is stronger for technological acquisitions than it is for the acquisitions of a 
firm in general. 
H2c: The patenting intensity of acquiring firms is negatively associated with the number of 
patents granted to the target firms prior to the acquisition.  
As concerns acquisitions for R&D purposes, a complementary relationship between 
acquisitions and own R&D has been proposed by some scholars, i.e. a positive association of 
R&D and patenting intensities and acquisitions (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1991; Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006). Opposed to this, Desyllas and Hughes (2008) analyse the association of R&D 
and patenting with acquisitions in a sample of broadly defined high technology industries. They 
find that decreasing returns from exploiting a firm’s existing knowledge base and the choice 
between making or buying R&D are main drivers for the acquisition of innovative firms and 
conclude that there is a substitutive link of firm’s own R&D with acquisitions which confirms 
earlier findings by Bloningen and Tyler (2000). However, Desyllas and Hughes (2008) also find 
a significant positive association between acquisition activities and the patent stock as a firm. I 
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intepret this as a complementarity between absorptive capacity generated through own R&D and 
acquisitions. For larger firms to benefit from the information gathered by small firms, absorptive 
capacity is necessary (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity here refers to a level of 
own technological knowledge that enables a large firm to integrate in an efficient and effective 
manner the technological knowledge gained with the acquisition of a small firm. One approach to 
assess the level of a firm’s own accumulated technological knowledge is to evaluate its patent 
stock accumulated over time whilst accounting the depreciation of the value of the knowledge 
reflected by patents over time (Hall, 1990; Hall et al. 2007). For technology-related acquisitions, 
absorptive capacity is more important, since here integration is more demanding. This leads to 
the following hypotheses with regard to patenting stock:  
H3a: The patent stock of acquiring firms is positively associated with the number of acquisitions. 
H3b: The association is stronger for technological acquisitions than it is for the acquisitions of a 
firm in general. 
H3c: The patent stock of acquiring firms is positively associated with the number of patents 
granted to target firms prior to the acquisition. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data for the quantitative analysis was collected from the SDC Platinum, Bloomberg and 
Worldscope Disclosure databases as well as the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
website. The data set comprises the largest firms in the EDA, biotech and semiconductor 
industries during the period of 1981 until 2004. However to avoid truncation bias with regards to 
patents, the analysis was subsequently limited to the 1981 to 2002 period.  Using USPTO patent 
data is appropriate since the large majority of the firms analysed are US-based and since in high 
technology industries, also non-US firms commonly apply for patents at the USPTO. Hence any 
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“home advantage” of US-based firms is very small. All firms making up the first 80 per cent of 
the market by sales value were included in each industry, resulting in 14 EDA, 50 semiconductor 
and 20 biotech firms being analysed. Data was collected on a number of variables concerning 
various acquirer firm characteristics, for which statistics and correlations are provided in Table 1.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Patents of a large firm are both, a measure of absorptive capacity (if used to calculate 
patent stock4) and for normalised R&D outputs (if used to calculate patent intensity). Patents of 
an acquired start-up can be used to assess the extent of its technological base and capabilities that 
are worth leveraging (Hoetker, 2005; Puranam et al., 2003; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). Using a 
five-year timeframe prior to the acquisition year to measure the level of technological knowledge 
is somewhat arbitrary, yet this approach has been utilised frequently before (Hoetker, 2005; 
Clooydt et al., 2006) because it is considered a suitable balance between the declining value of 
knowledge and patent protection which increases with every year a patent ages and the increasing 
level of knowledge stock with every additional year included to measure the level of 
technological knowledge. It was not possible to use operating margin and cash flow as measures 
for profitability, since these were empirically highly correlated with R&D intensity, especially in 
the semiconductor and EDA industries. Therefore, sales growth was used as a joint proxy for 
profitability and industry-related opportunities. Also location dummies and controls for leverage 
and liquidity are included since they affect acquisiti-ons (Desyllas & Hughes, 2008). All models 
are estimated with and without industry dummies. 
                                                     
4 Patent stock was calculated based on the method propose in Hall (1990), using a 15% depreciation rate. No 
adjustments were made to the number of granted patents for the application year that corresponds to the first year 
that the firm entered the data set.  
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To analyse panel data, two well-established models exist, namely random and fixed 
effects (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). Since the number of acquisitions and the technological 
value of acquisitions as measured based on prior patenting of the acquired start-ups are all count 
data, negative binomial random and fixed effects models are estimated for these as independent 
variables.  The difference between the fixed effects and the random effects model is based on 
whether the time-invariant effects are correlated with the regressors (which is the case for fixed 
effects) or (in case of the random effects model) not. For these models, the specification is: 
ε tiiit cu .+=  .         (1) 
itiitit ecy ++′+= Xβα       (2)  
where i = 1, …, N units under observation, and t = 1,…, T time periods for which data were 
collected. yit denotes an acquisition-related dependent variable for firm i in period t, Xit represents 
a set of independent variables, β’ a vector of coefficients, ci unobserved individual heterogeneity 
and eit an idiosyncratic error that satisfies E[eit|Xit, ci] = 0. The model is estimated through GLS 
assuming no correlation between eit and ci. For the fixed effects model, other than the random 
effects model, the assumption is that the individual effect ci is correlated with the time-variant 
independent variables Xit. This means that although the basic specification given in (1) and (2) 
remains, the interpretation differs, in that the disturbance ci is a constant (and thus represented by 
a dummy variable) for each unit of analysis, i.e. here for each specific firm. The fact that the 
disturbance is a constant in the fixed effects model implies that all time-invariant variables will 
be dropped during the estimation.  
To decide which of the two models (random or fixed effects) is more appropriate, the 
Hausman tst is involved. If the Hausman test is significant, then the fixed effects model is more 
appropriate.   
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RESULTS 
To quantitatively address the hypotheses developed earlier in the paper significant 
associations for the level at which large firms acquire and to what degree they acquire patents 
were analysed.  
Table 2 summarises the results concerning the total number of acquisitions (technology-related as 
well as not technology-related) for which a significant positive association is found for sales and 
for patent stock. For the R&D intensity the association is significant and negative. This means 
that firms with a high R&D intensity tend to acquire on average more than those with low R&D 
intensity. A company being headquartered in Asia is negatively associated with the total number 
of acquisitions.  
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Testing for joint significance shows, that the industry dummies are jointly significant (χ² 
= 6.83, p = 0.03) and the country dummies are jointly insignificant (χ² =  5.48, p = 0.14). 
Table 3 shows that for more narrowly technology-related acquisitions defined as the 
number of acquisitions of firms that were granted at least one patent, R&D intensity is negatively 
associated and patent stock positively. Beyond that being headquartered in Asia has a significant 
negative (as was also for the total number of acquisitions). In this case, testing for joint 
significance revealed, that both industry and country dummies are jointly insignificant (χ² = 1.11, 
p = 0.58 and χ² =  4.12, p = 0.25, respectively). 
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
            ------------------------------------------- 
 
Desyllas and Hughes (2008) argue that acquisitions of private firms should be more 
strongly related to the acquisition of innovation than those of large public firms, since private 
acquisitions refer more often to smaller start-ups that are specialised in technological niches. 
Distinguishing in this way between the acquisition of private and public firms as a proxy for 
technological proficiency is however a relatively imprecise approach. A more reliable indicator to 
assess the innovativeness of the acquired start-ups is whether or not they have patented at all 
recently to evaluate their recent patent stock (Puranam & Srikanth, 2004; Puranam et al., 2006). 
This is done in the models reported in Table 4 for which the dependent variable is the total 
number of patents granted to the acquired start-ups in the five years prior to acquisition and in the 
acquisition year itself. As can be seen, the main factors significantly associated with the number 
of patents that have been granted to the acquired firm until including the fifth year prior to the 
acquisition are patent stock (positive), patenting intensity (negative) and whether the company is 
headquartered in Japan (in both cases negative). 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
As before, testing for joint significance revealed, that the industry dummies are jointly 
significant (χ² = 1.10, p = 0.58) and the country dummies are jointly insignificant (χ² =  2.48, p = 
0.48). 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The exploratory interviews carried out in the biotech, EDA and semiconductor industries 
prior to the quantitative analysis (see Footnote 3) provide evidence, that many of the acquisitions 
in the three high technology industries I analyse are related to R&D aspects. This can be related 
to the obstacles to innovation in larger firms and the institutional division of labour for 
innovation. Witte (1973), Henderson (1993) and Hauschildt (1999) discuss reasons why firms 
may not be able or unwilling to carry out specific types of innovation. One response of firms to 
not being able to carry out an innovation at acceptable cost or within an acceptable timeframe can 
be the acquisition of start-ups in order to make up for their missing capabilities (Markides and 
Geroski, 2005) and to source the necessary technology. This is enabled by a division of labour in 
innovation between small start-ups and large incumbents, which would imply a substitutive 
relationship of own R&D and external acquisitions. On the other hand, it has been suggested that 
the link between making and buying R&D is complementary, especially as concerns the 
capability to absorb external knowledge (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). I have specified a set of 
hypotheses to formally test these propositions on the basis of quantitative data and partly based 
on insights from qualitative interviews. Overall, the results of this testing show that the patenting 
and R&D intensities of firms are associated significantly with firms’ acquisition activities as is 
proposed by the hypotheses.  
More specifically, H1a and H1b are confirmed based on the results reported in Tables 2 
and 3. In particular, in the case of H1b, the absolute strength of the association of R&D intensity 
with the number of acquisitions is more than 25% higher for technology-related acquisitions 
compared to overall acquisitions. However, H1c is rejected. H2a is rejected, whereas H2b is 
partly supported, since the coefficient for technology-related acquisitions is more than double the 
absolute value compared to that for acquisitions in general and is almost significant at the 10% 
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level (p = 0.12). H2c is fully supported, indicating a more narrow substitutability between 
acquirer and target patenting that was so far not tested for in the literature. This can be 
understood as a specific form of rational behaviour of acquiring firms that have a weakness 
mainly in exploitation (for which patenting intensity is a proxy), rather than exploration (for 
which R&D intensity proxies). As this only holds for the most direct measure of exploitation 
weakness (i.e. the number of patents granted, but not number of and likelihood of technology-
related acquisition), it suggests, that a weakness in terms of patents leads acquirers to specifically 
aim for those targets that can mitigate exactly this weakness by having a high number of patents 
in the field where the acquirers recent patenting is weak. Notably and supporting this 
interpretation, R&D intensity is not significant when the number of recent target patens is the 
dependent variable, but only patent intensity.  
H3a proposing a positive association of patent stock with the number of acquisitions is 
supported fully as is H3c proposing a positive association of patent stock with the number of 
patents granted to targets. Also, H3b concerning the comparative effect of patent stock is 
supported in that the effect more than double in absolute value (0.25 versus 0.12) for technology-
related acquisitions as compared to total acquisitions. 
Linking my findings from analysing the acquisitions of technology-related firms defined 
based on patents to extant literature, they support the intuition of Desyllas and Hughes (2008) 
that acquisitions of private firms relate more strongly to technology in that I find a similar pattern 
between acquisitions in general and technologically-related acquisitions (based on whether 
targets patent or not) as they find between public and private acquisitions in that most 
associations of R&D-related variables in my sample are stronger for technology-related and 
private acquisitions. For example, in line with the reasoning of Desyllas and Hughes (2008) that 
the effect sizes for R&D intensity are higher in absolute values for the acquisition of privately 
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held firms only, I find the same difference between the effect sizes of acquisitions in general and 
technology-related acquisitions i.e. a unit reduction of R&D intensity leads to higher increase of 
the number of acquired companies in the latter type of acquisitions.  
This means that I find similar qualitative relations as concerns the association of R&D 
intensity and patent-related variables with technological versus overall acquisitions. Hence once 
could conclude by analogy, that my findings (measuring more specifically technology-related 
targets) lend support to the proposition that private firms are more technology-oriented.5 This can 
be interpreted as a stronger substitutive relationship between R&D spending with technology-
related (or private, in the case of Desyllas and Hughes) acquisitions which could indicate that 
such acquisitions are a better substitute for own R&D and patenting than are acquisitions where 
targets are not patenting or acquisitions of publicly-listed firms. 
My analysis uses however an additional and more specific measure of technological 
orientation in that it also analyses the association of R&D-related acquirer characteristics with the 
total number of patents that targets were granted in the five years prior to acquisition. Desyllas 
and Hughes (2008) find that the ratio of patents applied for per assets is insignificant in all their 
regressions. A contribution of my paper is to evaluate this result using the more direct link of 
acquirer patenting with target patenting. My findings in this respect also support the notion that 
technology-related acquisitions compensate weakening exploitation indicated by lower patenting 
intensity and this finding also supports that acquisition of innovation is a substitute for own 
R&D, especially for technology-related ones.  
In terms of future research, given that the qualitative insights from my interviews also 
indicate that cooperation and innovation networks are potentially very relevant for firms to 
                                                     
5 It needs to be pointed out though, that Desyllas and Hughes (2008) do not formally test their argument of private 
firms being more strongly technology-oriented beyond casual case evidence. Hence my results using a more narrow 
definition of technology-relatedness (based on target patenting) are stronger evidence for the basic argument 
Desyllas and Hughes (2008) make. 
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address issues of weakening exploitation and reduced resource inputs to innovation activities, but 
that their role may differ according to the industry concerned, potential differences between 
industries with regard to this should be explored further. Also, as concerns licensing as yet 
another option of external technology sourcing, Gans et al. (2002) argue that small firms and 
start-ups are more likely to commercialise themselves (rather than licensing or aiming for 
acquisition), the lower the control over intellectual property (IP) rights, the higher transaction 
costs for finding a suitable partner for licensing or acquisition and the lower sunk costs associated 
with product market entry are. Conversely, for an acquirer licensing implies that the licensing 
party can exert stronger influence on the IP usage conditions for the licensee compared to the 
option of acquisition and the interplay of those two perspectives should determine the equilibri-
um level of acquisition. Hence this interplay could be another interesting area of future research. 
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TABLE 1  
Summary statistics and correlationsa 
  Variables Mean   Std.   
  Dev. 
Min. Max. Correlations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12           
1   Total number  
 of acquisitions 
 
0.65    1.25 0 11 -             
2   Financial  
 leverage b 
 
2.35 6.43 0.72  166.11 -0.02            
3   Current ratio b 0.05 0.13 0 0.89 -0.11*** -0.08**           
 
4   Sales growth   
 over previous  
 year b 
0.13 0.12 0 0.86 -0.04 0.05 0.19***          
 
5   Sales b, c 0.02 0.05 0 0.40 0.21*** -0.01 -0.03 -0.03         
 
6   R&D intensity b 6.48 13.46 0.04 292.68 -0.09** -0.01 0.21*** 0.04 -0.10***        
 
7   Patenting  
 intensity  b 
0.41 1.36 -12 19.53 -0.001 -0.04 -0.13*** -0.06 -0.40*** -0.09***       
 
8   Patent stock b, c 8.56 1.31 4.75 13.24 0.21*** -0.02 -0.38*** -0.19*** 0.05 -0.22*** 0.30***      
 
9   Firm headquar-   
 tered in Japan 
3.99 0.82 0 5.36 0.01 0.02 -0.18*** -0.09** 0.07* -0.08** -0.01 0.46***     
 
10 Firm headquar-   
 tered in Europe 
0.18 0.35 -0.26 7.43 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09** -0.02 0.16*** -0.04 -0.10*** -0.03 -0.12***    
 
11 Firm headquar- 
  tered in Asia 
0.24 0.17 0 0.95 -0.09*** 0.14*** -0.13*** 0.02 -0.14*** -0.06* 0.07** -0.01 -0.14*** -0.10***   
 
12 DJS industry  
 Technology 
15.85 13.02 0 50 0.10*** 0.04 -0.34*** -0.07** -0.46*** -0.20*** 0.32*** 0.16*** -0.16*** -0.09*** 0.18***  
 
13 DJS industry  
 Healthcare  
0.79 0.41 0 1 -0.09** -0.06 0.48*** 0.13*** 0.48*** 0.26*** -0.31*** -0.48*** -0.24*** 0.03 -0.12*** -0.77*** 
 
 
 
a  * p < 0.1;  
   ** p < .05;  
   *** p < 0.01 
        
b Lagged by one year 
c Logarithmized 
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TABLE 2 
RE negative binominal regression, dependent variable: total number of all acquisitions 
    Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   
    Financial leverage 
    (total assets to total equity) 
 
-0.0331 
(0.0567) 
-0.0320 
(0.0628) 
    Current ratio 
    (current assets to current liabilities) 
 
-0.0063  
(0.0314) 
0.0151 
(0.0312) 
    Sales growth 
   (% over previous year) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
    Sales 
    (natural logarithm of net sales in 1000 €) 
 
0.0962 
(0.0472)** 
0.1728 
(0.0597)*** 
    R&D intensity 
    (R&D expenditure to net sales in %) 
 
-0.0044 
(0.0020)** 
-0.0034 
(0.0020)* 
    Patent stock 
    (Cumulated number of (depreciated) patents granted) 
 
0.1567 
(0.0611)** 
0.1223 
(0.0647)* 
    Patenting intensity  
    (Patents granted by application year to net sales) 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0010) 
-0.0010 
(0.0010) 
    Company headquartered in Japan 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.6202 
(0.4053) 
-0.3329 
(0.4435) 
    Company headquartered in Europe 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.4485 
(0.4410) 
-0.4201 
(0.4375) 
    Company headquartered in Asia 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.9497 
(0.4196)** 
-0.8947 
(0.4113)** 
    DJS industry Technology  
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: Other) 
 
- 0.7158 
(0.4667) 
    DJS industry Healthcare 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: Other) 
 
- -0.1581 
(0.6098) 
    Constant 
 
0.0705 
(0.8221) 
-1.0447 
(0.9511) 
 
   Log-likelihood 
    ln(r) 
    ln(s) 
 
 
-652.6827 
2.3616  
0.4391 
 
-649.2473 
2.4644 
0.5287 
    No. of observations (No. of groups) 
 
660 (81) 660 (81) 
    Wald Chi² 
          p-value 
 
84.14 
< 0.0000 
92.47 
0.0000 
    Hausman specification test 
         Chi² 
         p-value 
 
6.52 
0.2589 
 
7.20 
0.7063 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; unbalanced panel data, observations per group: min 
= 1; max = 16; average = 8.1; Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled for Model 1: Chi² = 75.84, p-value > Chi² < 0.001; test 
for joint significance of year dummies: Chi² = 34.92, p-value > Chi² = 0.0025; Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled for 
Model 2: Chi² = 61.07, p-value > Chi² < 0.001; test for joint significance of year dummies: Chi² = 35.28, p-value > 
Chi² = 0.0022 
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TABLE 3 
Random-effects negative binominal regression, dependent variable: number of 
technological acquisitions 
    Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   
    Financial leverage 
    (total assets to total equity) 
 
-0.0026 
(0.0210) 
-0.0023 
(0.0205) 
    Current ratio 
    (current assets to current liabilities) 
 
-0.0020 
(0.0385) 
0.0007 
(0.0409) 
    Sales growth 
   (% over previous year) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0007) 
0.0001 
(0.0007) 
    Sales 
    (natural logarithm of net sales in 1000 €) 
 
0.0584 
(0.0515) 
0.0648 
(0.0687) 
    R&D intensity 
    (R&D expenditure to net sales in %) 
 
-0.0047 
(0.0026)* 
-0.0047 
(0.0027)* 
    Patent stock 
    (Cumulated number of (depreciated) patents granted) 
 
0.2441 
(0.0692)*** 
0.2510 
(0.0756)*** 
    Patenting intensity  
    (Patents granted by application year to net sales) 
 
-0.0019 
(0.0013) 
-0.0021 
(0.0013) 
    Company headquartered in Japan 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
0.7084 
(0.4122)* 
-0.5081 
(0.4540) 
    Company headquartered in Europe 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.6292 
(0.4892) 
-0.4839 
(0.5012) 
    Company headquartered in Asia 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.7655 
(0.4524)* 
-0.7727 
(0.4550)* 
    DJS industry Technology  
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: Other) 
 
- 0.5041 
(0.4849) 
    DJS industry Healthcare 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: Other) 
 
- 0.4162 
(0.6615) 
    Constant 
 
1.0018 
(2.5764) 
0.5236 
(2.8283) 
 
   Log-likelihood 
    ln(r) 
    ln(s) 
 
 
-453.8760 
4.0673 
0.4999 
 
-453.3208 
4.1556 
0.5022 
    No. of observations (No. of groups) 
 
660 (81) 660 (81) 
    Wald Chi² 
          p-value 
 
63.00 
0.0000 
64.13 
0.0001 
    Hausman specification test 
         Chi² 
         p-value 
 
0.01 
1.0000 
 
0.01 
0.9997 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; unbalanced panel data, observations per group: min 
= 1; max = 16; average = 8.1; Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled for Model 1: Chi² =31.58, p-value > Chi² < 0.001; test 
for joint significance of year dummies: Chi² = 23.98, p-value > Chi² = 0.0654; Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled for 
Model 2: Chi² = 31.40, p-value > Chi² < 0.001; test for joint significance of year dummies: Chi² = 23.67, p-value > 
Chi² = 0.0709 
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TABLE 4 
Random-effects negative binominal regression, dependent variable: total number of patents 
granted to targets in the five years prior to acquisition 
    Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   
    Financial leverage 
    (total assets to total equity) 
 
-0.0696 
(30.0856) 
-0.0708 
(0.0864) 
    Current ratio 
    (current assets to current liabilities) 
 
-0.0020 
(0.0363) 
-8.70e-06 
(0.0387) 
    Sales growth 
   (% over previous year) 
 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
0.0002 
(0.0007) 
    Sales 
    (natural logarithm of net sales in 1000 €) 
 
0.0910 
(0.0404)** 
0.0964 
(0.0591) 
    R&D intensity 
    (R&D expenditure to net sales in %) 
 
-0.0038 
(0.0025) 
-0.0038 
(0.0026) 
    Patent stock 
    (Cumulated number of (depreciated) patents granted) 
 
0.1946 
(0.0511)*** 
0.1985 
(0.0586)*** 
    Patenting intensity  
    (Patents granted by application year to net sales) 
 
-0.0019 
(0.0011)* 
-0.0020 
(0.0011)* 
    Company headquartered in Japan 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.7453 
(0.2858)*** 
-0.6016 
(0.3243)* 
    Company headquartered in Europe 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.7162 
(0.3866)* 
-0.6022 
(0.4078) 
    Company headquartered in Asia 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: United States) 
 
-0.4584 
(0.3591) 
-0.4641 
(0.3605) 
    DJS industry Technology  
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: Other) 
 
- 0.3199 
(0.3589) 
    DJS industry Healthcare 
    (dummy; 1 = yes; base category: Other) 
 
- 0.2616 
(0.5250) 
    Constant 
 
 -4.4666 
(0.6143847)*** 
-4.835   
(0.7613)*** 
 
    Log-likelihood 
    ln(r) 
    ln(s) 
 
 
-1223.8385 
-0.9425 
3.9063 
 
-1223.4282 
-0.9536 
3.8572 
    No. of observations (No. of groups) 
 
660 (81) 660 (81) 
    Wald Chi² 
          p-value 
 
54.37 
0.0006 
55.36 
0.0010 
    Hausman specification test 
         Chi² 
         p-value 
 
4.33 
0.5024 
 
0.00 
0.9991 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; unbalanced panel data, observations per group: min 
= 1; max = 16; average = 8.1; Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled for Model 1: Chi² =14.56, p-value > Chi² < 0.001; test 
for joint significance of year dummies: Chi² = 12.40, p-value > Chi² = 0.6487; Likelihood-ratio test vs. pooled for 
Model 2: Chi² =14.27, p-value > Chi² < 0.001; test for joint significance of year dummies: Chi² =10.79, p-value > 
Chi² = 0.7671 
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